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Abstract
The Italian Jobs Act introduced a subsidy for new hirings as well as a new open ended labor contract
based on graded security, with severance payments increasing with tenure, while phasing out the compul-
sory reinstatement of workers in the case of unfair dismissals applied until March 2015. Simple models of
job creation and destruction predict that hiring subsidies and lower firing costs unambiguously increase
hirings. Moreover, lower firing costs associated with graded security should also increase layoffs. These
effects need not to be uniform across the size distribution of firms, especially when firms of different size
are treated differently by the policy changes as in the case of the Jobs Act. On the one hand, the hiring
subsidy was proportional to wages, but had a cap, hence was more generous for small firms- typically
paying lower wages than large firms - making them particularly responsive along the job creation margin.
On the other hand, the reduction in firing costs applied mainly to large firms concentrating on them the
adjustment along the job destruction margin. To investigate empirically the effects of the Italian Jobs
Act, we draw on a unique dataset covering the universe of private firms in Italy having at least once 10
to 20 employees in the two years prior to the reform of January 2015. We find evidence of a substantial
increase in open ended hirings, and in the transformation of fixed-term into open ended contracts, in the
aftermath of the Jobs Act. The effects of the Jobs Act on firings- conversely- are much smaller, and are
concentrated on large firms, while small firms react more intensively- creating new open ended contracts-
to the hiring subsidy.
Keywords: Labor Mobility, Jobs Act.
JEL codes: J10, J23.
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Highlights
• The Jobs Act was a structural reform of employment protection
• According to our model it should have affected both hirings and firings
• It had a different impact on small and large firms
• Large firms were less responsive than small firms on the hiring margin
• Small firms were not responsive on the firing margin
• On the hirings margin the dominant effect was from the initial large hiring subsidy
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1 Introduction
The effects of a reduction of employment protection on labor market mobility have been thoroughly investi-
gated by models of dynamic labor demand as well as by equilibrium models of the labor market.1 Economic
theory unambiguously predicts that a labor market with more flexibility for standard labor contracts should
be associated with larger job and worker flows. In real life labor markets, however, structural reforms of
employment protection legislation (EPL) are rare events (Boeri, 2011), and most reforms implemented in
Europe over the last twenty years are two-tier reforms, which have been acting on the flexible fringe of the
labor market, with more and more flexibility granted only to fixed-term contracts.2 These reforms created
a dual structure, particularly significant in Southern Europe, with a stock of open ended contracts largely
unaffected by the reforms, coexisting with a growing part of the labor market experiencing greater flexibility
at the margin. In addition to being relatively rare events, reforms of employment protection for regular
contracts often introduce marginal adjustments to the legislation, and/or a long phasing-in period making
it difficult to identify empirically the pure effect of the reform of EPL on labor mobility.
The Italian Jobs Act (JA) is a structural labor market reform aimed at reducing the dual structure in the
labor market. As of March 2015, Italy introduced a new labor contract for all new open ended jobs based
on graded security, with severance payments steadily increasing with tenure. This design of the contract
had been advocated within policy-oriented academic circles (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2008; Cahuc et al. 2012;
Bentolila and Jimeno, 2008) as well as by the research community (Blanchard and Tirole, 2008; Boeri,
Garibaldi and Moen, 2017). The reform introduced a discrete change to the legislation as the traditional
reinstatement clause applied to firms with more than 15 employees in the case of unfair dismissals was
suppressed for all new hires on a open ended basis. The reform also reduced dramatically the discretion of
judges in dismissal procedures: severance payments were made dependent on tenure based on well defined
rules and the possibility of out-of-Court procedures was also introduced.3 Overall, there is little doubt that
the Italian JA represents a complete (rather than two-tier) and discrete (rather than marginal) reform, hence
a rather unique experiment for testing the labor market effects of reforms of EPL. 4
A few months before changing the rules for new open ended contracts, a sizeable hiring subsidy was
introduced for any new job opened on a permanent basis. Disentangling the effects of the JA from those
of the hiring subsidy is difficult. There are, however, some asimmetries in the enforcement of the hiring
subsidy and of the JA by size of firms which turn out to be useful in separating the effects of the EPL
reform from those of the new hiring subsidy. First, the hiring subsidy basically exempted employers from
paying social security contributions on all new open ended hirings for three years up to a cap located below
average wages. Thus, the subsidy was particularly generous for low-wage, mostly small, firms. Second, the
new graded security contract implied a reduction of EPL only for firms above the 15 employees threshold,
while leaving mostly unaffected firms below that threshold.
In this paper we use these asymmetries and the time-lag between the introduction of the hiring subsidy
and the JA contract to make inferences about the effects of the two policy changes. Our approach is in line
with the increasing literature identifying the effects of EPL exploiting within-country variable enforcement
of the legislation 5 rather than cross-country variation in the strictness of employment protection 6 At the
same time, the structural nature of the reform we investigate and the richness of our data allow us to analyse
1Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Nickell (1986), Garibaldi (1998), Millard and Mortensen (1995) . See Boeri and vanOurs
(2013) for a survey.
2There is large literature on dual labor markets. Boeri Garibaldi (2007) and Berton and Garibaldi (2012) model the Italian
labor market. Cahuc et al. refer to France (2016)
3This reduced power of judges in the enforcement of EPL was so radical to be vetoed in 2018 by the Italian Constitutional
Court.
4Early research on the Italian JA include Sestito and Viviano (2018) and Fana et al. (2015)
5See e.g. Riphahn (2004); Boeri and Jimeno (2005); Garibaldi et al. (2004); Ichino and Riphahn (2005); Behaghel, Crepon,
and Sdillot (2008); Kugler and Pica (2008); Marinescu (2009); Martins (2009); Hijzen, Mondauto, and Scarpetta (2013);
Cingano, Leonardi, Messina, and Pica (2016). The impact of changes in severance pay are studied in Garibaldi and Pacelli
(2008), and Kugler (1995).
6Cross country studies aimed at capturing the long-term effects of EPL are also difficult to interpret, as employment
protection legislation interacts with a number of other country-specific institutions (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000).
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the effects of the EPL reform on a number of relevant margins, including firms’ growth, hirings and firings,
and transformation of fixed-term into open ended contracts.
We draw on a unique dataset covering the universe of private firms having at least once 10 to 20 employees
in the period 2013-2016. We concentrate on those hitting this corridor in the period 2013-14 predating
the introduction of the JA. Firms are monitored at monthly frequencies by the Italian social security ad-
ministration (INPS). These are high quality data as they are used to collect contributions from employers,
define pension rights and eligibility to social programmes. We also have access to work-histories of the entire
workforce employed by those firms. The total number of firms that hit the corridor between 2013 and 2016
corresponds to approximately 240,000 Italian firms, and approximately 6.2 million workers.
The structure of the paper is threefold.
At first we provide a simple theoretical framework enabling us to discuss the effects of the two key measures
of the JA – the hiring subsidy and the graded security contract – on the hiring and firing margins at the
job/firm level. We also evaluate potential differential effects along the size distribution of firms, and we
discuss the implications of the JA in dual labor markets, notably on fixed-term contracts.
Next we describe the data and generate a set of descriptive statistics documenting the key phenomena
associated to the Italian JA. We also construct transition matrices for firms between 10 and 20 employees,
and obtain scalar measures of mobility across cells (Shorrock, 1978). We complete our analysis of firms’
dynamics by disentangling upward and downward mobility. Finally we look at hiring and firing of open
ended jobs at the firm level, as well as at the conversion of fixed-term contracts into open ended contracts.
We then present the estimation framework and illustrate the main econometric results. We begin by
concentrating on the first difference, that is, before and after the JA, looking at the effects of the reform on
hirings both in open ended and fixed-term contracts as well as on transformations from fixed-term into open
ended contracts. Here we exploit the fact that the hiring subsidy was introduced in January 2015, while the
new graded security contract in March 2015. Next, we use the two aformentioned asymmetries in the impact
of the JA across the size distribution of firms to draw on cross-sectional variation in the enforcement of the
JA. In particular, we compare outcomes in firms having more than 15 employees with those of firms below
that threshold before the JA as only the former were subject to the discrete EPL reform. We also look at
firms and jobs that benefitted from the hiring subsidy, and those that did not because of the restrictions
imposed by the regulation to avoid opportunistic behavior. We also ackowledge that the intensity of the
hiring subsidy treatment was higher in low wage firms, as the subsidy had a cap at 8060 Euros, reduced
in 2016 to 3250 Euros. Overall, we find evidence of a substantial increase in open ended hiring and in the
transformation of fixed-term into open ended contracts, in the aftermath of the Jobs Act. The effects of the
Jobs Act on firings- conversely- are much smaller, and are concentrated on large firms, while small firms
react more intensively- creating new open ended contracts- to the hiring subsidy.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional setting, the Italian JA and provides a
short summary of the relevant literature. Section 3 provides a simple stylized characterisation of the labor
market in which the JA operates and evaluates theoretically the consequences of the hiring subsidy and
of the graded security contract on job creation and destruction margins. Section 4 describes the data and
reports descriptive statistics on firms’ dynamics and worker flows. Section 5 describes our empirical strategy
and reports the main results on hirings per firm, on conversions of fixed-term contracts as well as on firings.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Institutional Setting and Literature Review
With the “Jobs Act” (JA) adopted in December 2014, the Italian Government obtained from the Parliament
a broad mandate to introduce measures to rationalise employment protection, expand active labour market
policies and make social protection more effective. The reform of employment protection was the most
radical.7The previous open ended contract for firms with more than 15 employees involved the compulsory
7The delegation law involved also a reform of the unemployment benefits that, however, became fully effective in 2017,
beyond the period covered by this paper.
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reinstatement of workers in the case of unfair dismissals. This reinstatement, although rarely enacted (about
3,000 cases in a typical year), was a strong deterrent to hiring in open ended contracts as it made the costs
of dismissals very high (up to 36 months of pay) even for very short tenures. The reinstatement was a major
deterrent because there is a risk of a long trial and eventually a reinstatement, with the employer having
also to pay back the worker during the trial period. The new open ended contract introduced in March
2015 allowed for employment protection increasing with tenure, confining the possibility of reinstatement of
workers to discriminatory dismissals, hence excluding this possibility for dismissals due to economic reasons
(motivo oggettivo). The new contract was applied only to new open ended contracts while “grandfathering”
existing rights. The new graded security contract replaced the reinstatement with a monetary compensation
for economic unfair dismissals. This severance payment is flat at 4 monthly wages for the first two years,
and then increasing with tenure up to a maximum of 24 monthly wages at a 12 years tenure (see Figure
1). The Jobs Act also introduced a new form of out-of-court procedure, according to which the employer
can pay the worker an indemnity equal to 2 monthly wages in the first two years of tenure and then an
additional monthly wage per year of service, with a maximum of 18 monthly wages after 18 years of service
(displayed as “Out of Court Procedure” in the diagram). The acceptance of this transaction prevents any
further dispute by the worker, that is, appealing to courts for a dismissal to be unfair or not. Both parties
have a strong incentive to settle the dispute through this procedure, since the sum paid is not subject to
social contributions or taxation. As mentioned above, the new dismissal rules applied to all new hires on
a open ended basis, and did not involve workers continuing on permanent contracts in firms with more
than 15 employees, who continued to be protected by the reinstatement clause. However, firms with less
than 15 employees (where the reinstatement clause was not applied even before the JA) expanding above
the threshold would move all workers (not only new hires) to the new graded security contract dismissal
regulations, while before the JA they would have been subject to the reinstatement clause in this case. Thus,
changes in employment protection for units below the 15 employees threshold were confined to their option
to grow above that threshold. No change in dismissal regulations was envisaged for workers in firms with
less than 15 employees remaining below that size threshold, as the open ended contract was already flexible
with a maximum severance payment of 6 months. In the remainder we refer to the new contract as the JA
contract or the graded security contract.
The 2015 Budget Law also introduced a sizeable hiring subsidy for new hires in open ended contracts.
Basically employers were exempted from paying social security contributions up to a 8,060 Euros cap per
year and worker lasting three years after the hire. In order to discourage opportunistic behavior of employers,
the hiring subsidy excluded workers with an open ended contract in the previous six months (and with an
open ended contract with the same firm in the 3 months before December 2014). The hiring subsidy applied
uniformly to all firms and there was no firm size threshold associated to this policy. However, the cap on
the subsidy made it more generous at relatively low wages, mostly in small, firms. Notice that the hiring
subsidy was in place since January 2015 and had a three years duration for contracts signed within 2015,
while the JA contract was enforced as of March 2015 and was supposed to apply gradually to all open ended
contracts and for good.
There is some literature offering preliminary evaluations of the JA contract, and a number of papers using
the 15 employees threshold to identify the effects of employment protection in the Italian labor market.
Sestito and Viviano (2018) use administrative data on worker flows from the so-called Comunicazioni Ob-
bligatorie (Cob) in a specific Italian region (Veneto) and in the period from January 2013 to June 2015.
They identify the effects of the hiring subsidy and the JA by using both the 15 employees threshold and
the fact that some workers were not eligible to the hiring subsidy (e.g., those with an open ended contract
in the previous six months or with an open ended contract with the same firm in the 3 months before Dec
2014). They find that gross hirings were positively affected by both, the hiring subsidy and the JA contract,
but the two effects were quantitatively different: while about 40 % of gross hires in permanent contracts
can be accounted for by the hiring subsidy, about 5% of these flows can be attributed to the effects of the
introduction of the graded security contract. The joint effect of the two measures is negligible. Yet, Sestito
and Viviano (2018) do not look at firing nor at transformations of fixed-term into open ended contracts,
and their analysis focuses only on the first 3 months of the new contract. Leonardi and Nannicini (2016),
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in an unpublished presentation drawing also on Cob data found that about one fourth of the effect of the
two policies on gross hires could be attributed to the graded security contract. Finally, Fana, Guarrascio
and Cirillo (2015), using aggregate data from Istat and Inps, found that the JA did not affect employment
growth.
There are more and more empirical studies on employment protection drawing on within country variation
in the enforcement of EPL, notably using the exemption of small units from the strictest EPL provisions
to disantangle treatment and control groups. Garibaldi, Pacelli and Borgarello (2004), using stochastic
transition matrices in firm size, looked at firm mobility around the threshold, finding that it falls as firms get
closer to the 15 employees size. Schivardi and Torrini (2008) similarly found that the probability of firms’
growth falls by 2 percentage points near that threshold. Boeri and Jimeno (2005) used the 15 employees
threshold as a second difference in evaluating a reform of employment protection: they found that a tightening
of employment protection in small firms reduced layoffs below the threshold relative to a control group of
large firms.
Another strand of literature which is relevant for our purposes is on the economics of graded security.
Boeri, Garibaldi and Moen (2017) develop a normative theory of severance pay, providing an optimal level
of graded security at different tenure levels, depending on the efficiency of the judicial system. Boeri and
Garibaldi (2008), Dolado et al. (2016) as well as Bentolila and Jimeno (2008) discuss the rationale for a
unifying contract reducing contractual dualism between temporary and open ended contracts. This contract
provides for severance increasing with tenure just like the new open-ended contract introduced by the Italian
JA.
Figure 1: The Jobs Act Graded Security Contract
Severance
Y ears of Tenure
Months
2
4
12
18
24
2 12 18
Economic, Disciplinary Unfair
Out of Court Procedure
3 Theoretical Background: Hiring and Firing
The two policy measures of the JA can be described in the context of dynamic models of labor demand
(Nickell, 1986, Bertola 1990) or matching models of job creation and destruction, along the Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994) framework. In the paper and in the appendix we use the latter approach, and offer a
theoretical framework to evaluate the two policies in the spirit of the matching model proposed by Garibaldi
and Violante (2005). The model is fully in line with the traditional Mortensen and Pissarides matching
model (2014), but rather than using the standard matching function for job creation, it makes explicit the
role of hiring and firing at the firm level. The model turns out to be particularly suitable for describing the
role of the two policies on hiring (job creation) and firing (job destruction) margins. For simplicity, the model
takes the wage as given, an assumption that is somewhat reasonable in the context of small Italian firms
where wages are set by centralized wage bargaining and there is no plant-level bargaining over and above
these levels. The key details of the model are described in the appendix. Following Garibaldi and Violante
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(2005), the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity is indicated with F (x), the hiring margin is denoted by
Ro while the firing margin by Rd. The two policy instruments are a severance payment (or a firing tax) S
and a hiring subsidy H(ω)8. The dependence of the hiring subsidy on the wage will be discussed below.
The key equations that describe the two margins read
Ro − ω = − λr+λ
∫ x
Rd
(1− F (z))dz + λS − (r + λ)H(ω); Hiring Margin
Rd − ω = − λr+λ
∫ x
Rd
(1− F (z))dz − rS; Firing Margin
(1)
where ω is the fixed wage, r is the pure interest rate, and λ is the arrival rate of job specific idiosyncratic
shocks. Note that in the model the matching probabilty is indicated with α and the two labor flows are Hir = α[1− F (Ro)]
Fir = λF (Rd)
(2)
The basic equilibrium of the two margins is easily described in a space (Rd, Ro), as illustrated in Figure 2.
In the basic model, the firing margin Rd is independent of the hiring margin, and is described by a flat curve
labelled Fir. The hiring margin is described by the upward sloping curve, labelled Hir. The equilibrium is
at the intersection of the two curves as indicated by the locus E1 in Figure 2.
This model is useful to analyse the effects of the JA. Let us consider first the hiring subsidy. A basic hiring
subsidy shifts the creation margin to the left, and implies larger hirings and job creation. This is described
by the left panel in Figure 3. A hiring subsidy moves the equilibrium from E1 to E2 in the Figure. Yet, there
is an additional feature of the hiring subsidy that is worth mentioning. As described in the previous Section,
the hiring subsidy was proportional to gross wages, but had a cap. In particular, it could not exceed 8,060
Euros exempting employers from paying social security contributions for gross wages up to approximately
24, 000 Euros. For wages above that level, there was no full exemption of employers from social security
contributions. Put it another way, the hiring subsidy was proportional to wages only for relatively low-wage
firms while it was flat for high wage firms, offering a lower percentage reduction of labor costs than in small
firms. We can formally describe this feature by assuming that the hiring subsidy is declining with wages,
i.e., that H(ω) with H ′ < 0, so that firms with higher wages have a lower subsidy.
The presence of a firm size firm wage effect is an empirical stylized fact (Oi, 1999) confirmed also by Italian
firm-level data. This means that the hiring subsidy gave to small firms a larger reduction in unit labor costs
than to large firms. Suppose then to have two groups of firms. On the one hand, there are small firms
paying relatively low wages. On the other hand, there are large firms paying high wages. The prediciton of
the model is that small firms should respond more on the hiring margin (in other words, should create jobs
at lower productivity levels) than large firms, and move to an equilibrium like E3 in Figure 3 to the left of
E2, the new equilibrium for large firms.
Let us now consider the effects of the introduction of graded security. In the context of the model, this
policy can be described as a reduction in S. The firing curve shifts up implying more fires at given hirings,
that is, firms initiate firing at a higher productivity threshold than without the reform. The hiring curve also
shifts to the left as the value of a job for a firm is increased by lower firing costs. Thus, we should expect a
shift up of both the firing and hiring curves, as depicted in the right-hand side panel of Figure 3 bringing us
to a new equilibrium like E4. Yet, the introduction of graded security, as discussed in the previous Section,
involved only firms above the 15 employee threshold, i.e. relatively large firms.
The overall predictions for the effects of the JA contract and the hiring subsidy on open ended contracts
are therefore as follows. Small firms should experience an increase in hirings without any effect on firing.
Large firms, instead should experience both, an increase in hiring and firing. Whether the increase in hiring
8In the context of fixed wages, there is no substantial difference between a firing tax and a severance payment, and the latter
- a transfer from the firm to the worker- better describes the mechanism we want to highlight
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is larger in small or large firms is an empirical matter: it depends on whether the reduction in firing costs
can be offset the relative disadvantages of large vis-a-vis small firms put in place by the design of the hiring
subsidy. On the firing side, instead, there is no ambiguity: the increase in firing should be concentrated on
large firms.
Figure 2: Basic Equilibrium with Hiring and Firing Margins
Rd
R0
Fir
Hir
E1
Note: Ro is the hiring margin and Rd is the firing margin in the model with fixed wages.
The two curves correspond to equations 2 in the text.
E1 is the initial equilibrium.
Figure 3: Equilibrium with Hiring Subsidy in Large and Small Firms
Rd
R0
Fir
Hir
E1
Hir′
E2
Hir′′
E3
Rd
R0
Fir
Hir
E1
Hir′
E2
Fir′
Hir′′
E4
Left Panel: The low hiring subsidy for high wage firms shifts upward Hir lowering Ro to E2, hence increasing hirings.
Left Panel: The high hiring subsidy for firms with low wages shifts further upward Hir lowering Ro to E3 hence increasing
hirings.
Right Panel : The low firing cost (coupled with the low hiring subsidy) shifts upwards the firing curve (Fir) and the new
equilibrium (E4) has a higher Rd involving higher firings.
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The model above considers only open ended contracts. We know that substantial hiring in Italy takes
place via fixed-term contracts. In the case of contracts of limited duration there are two effects at work.
On the one hand, a reduction in EPL and the hiring subsidy limited to open ended contracts should induce
a substitution of fixed-term with open ended hirings. On the other hand, fixed-term contracts are often
used like extended probationary periods predating their conversion into open ended contracts. Under these
conditions, an increase in the value of an open ended job for the employer increases also the option value
of hiring on a fixed-term basis, having then the option to transform the job into an open ended contract
when the match quality is tested. A priori it is not possible to establish which one of the two effects will
dominate. There is instead no ambiguity about transformations of fixed-term into open ended contracts
which are bound to increase as both, the substitution and the option value effects, operate in the same
direction, by increasing the conversions of fixed-term into open-ended contracts. As to differences in the size
of firms, the option value effect can be considered to be lower in small firms due to their lower firing costs
and better monitoring of individual workers. If the substitution effect plays a more important role in small
units, we should expect to observe a stronger reduction (or a smaller increase) in fixed-term hirings in small
relative to large firms.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
The extraction from the social security records is based on the employment level of firms. The original dataset
was built by extracting from the archives all private firms that between January 2013 and December 2016
had hit the band 10-20 employees at least once. This corresponds to approximately 240.000 firms, employing
roughly 6.2 million workers over the 3 years time span covered by our data. Administrative data have the
advantage of providing good high frequency data. Hence we decided to operate with monthly observations.
The total number of records and observations over these 48 months is approximately 250 million. As the size
of firms is endogenous to the JA, the paper works with a subsample of firms having hit the 10-20 employee
band in the period January 2013 December 2014, that is, the sub-period predating the introduction of the
JA. We also removed from the sample all firms experiencing the net hiring of more than 100 workers (or a
tenfold increase in their initial size) within any given month. This very large growth was indeed attributed to
mergers or acquisitions rather than to a genuine growth of firms. In descriptive analyses and regressions we
focus only on continuing firms, displaying positive employment levels throughout the entire period covered
by our data. When we look at firings, the behaviour of entrants and exiting firms is also considered. In the
continuing sample there are approximately 44000 firms employing an average of 12.2 employees, thus having
approximately 536000 jobs. Including firms that enter and exit there are in the sample approximately 60000
firms.
For each firm, beyond the basic details (province, city, sector, age, 4-digits sector, etc.) we observe at
monthly frequencies the total number of full-time and part time employees, the number of fixed-term and
open ended contracts. Note that Inps calculates also the “firm labor force” (forza aziendale), a full time
equivalent concept that we use to identify the 15 employees threshold. This variable is rounded at integer
values. In the legislation there is a specific definition that labor Courts should apply for measuring firm size
around the threshold. Specifically, to obtain the relevant firm size in applying EPL, the judges count i) full
time average open ended contracts in the last 6 months, ii) part time open ended full time equivalent in the
last 6 months, and iii) average fixed-term employees hired in the last 24 months weighted by their effective
job duration. The actual value is rounded at integer values. This suggests that in practice the threshold
is not readily observed. The concept of “forza aziendale” compiled by Inps is a reasonable proxy of the
threshold defined by the law, thus we use it in our analysis. However, the legal definition is more subtle,
and it is not even obvious that employers in firms around the threshold know at each point in time whether
they are above or below the threshold.
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4.1 Threshold Passing
We are first of all interested in assessing firms’ dynamics before and after the JA. We begin by investigating
threshold passage. Before March 2015 firms passing the 15 employees threshold were subject to the rein-
statement clause in case of unfair dismissals. Conversely, as of March 2015 firms that pass the 15 employees
threshold are no longer subject to the reinstatement in case of unfair dismissals for their entire workforce,
regardless of the tenure of their workers. We are interested in finding out whether this change led to more
firms passing the 15 employees threshold, as one would expect. We consider only continuing firms, hence we
do not cover firms entry and exit.
Formally, let us define with Lit firm size at time t, where t refers to (year/month). Threshold pass is
defined as
Threshold Pass =
 1 if Li,t ≥ 16 and Li,t−j < 16 with j = 1, 3, 12
0 otherwise,
or simply as moving beyond the 15 employees in a given interval. The legislation changed on March 7 2015,
and the threshold passage can be defined on a monthly, quarterly as well as yearly basis. Figure 4 reports
the simple counts of firms passing the threshold for each month, whereas the definition used in the Figure
refers to the 12 month passage. In Figure 4 the vertical lines denote the three important dates in the JA.
The first line refers to end December 2014, where the sizeable marginal hiring subsidies were introduced.
The second vertical line refers to March 2015 when graded security was introduced. The last line refers to
the end of December 2015, when the magnitude of the marginal hiring subsidy was reduced by 50 percent
for new hires following that date.9
We find that threshold passage increased substantially with the JA contract. The increase in passage
probably began already with the marginal hiring subsidy, but we clearly observe an acceleration after March
2015. We also observe a marked reduction in 2016, after the scaling down of the hiring subsidy, but still at
the end of 2016 the number of firms passing the threshold was twice as large than in 2014.
4.2 Mobility
Beyond the increase in threshold size passing, we are interested in understanding whether there was a
change in firm mobility with the introduction of the graded security contract. We evaluate firm mobility
by generating transition matrices across firm-size cells10, and then computing mobility indexes. The focus
is, once more, on continuing firms. Formally, in this section we take as state st the firm size at time t. We
consider st ∈ {≤ 11, 12, .......19,≥ 20} as a set recording firm size in 10 different cells, where sit is size for
firm i at time t measured with the firm labor force indicator compiled by INPS. The lower (10) and upper
(20) size classes also include firms with less than 10 and more than 20 employees respectively. The matrix
Mt records simply the probability of changing size sit to size si,t+12
st+12 = Mtst
The literature on stochastic processes provides various scalar mobility indexes summarizing the information
reported in the transition matrices. Figure 5 reports the value of one of these measures, the Shorrock index,
between 2015 and 2016.11 Formally, the trace measure reads
Trace Measure =: 1− m− Tr(M)
m− 1 (3)
9The same three vertical lines are reported in most Figures throughout the paper.
10The transition matrices are in the web appendix.
11 Shorrock (1978) introduced also the Determinant measure
det(M)
m−1 f, where det(M) is the determinant of the stochastic
matrix. Sommers and Conslik (1979) introduced the Eigenvalue measure: one minus the modulus of the second largest eigenvalue
of M . In addition, the mean crossing measure is the sum over i and j (from 1 to m) of M
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where Tr(M) is the trace of M and m is the number of states. Figure 5 points to a marked increase in
overall mobility, notably after the introduction of the JA contract. On average, mobility increases by more
than 5 % (from 0.72 in the period before the introduction of the JA contract to 0.76 in the period March
2015 through December 2016).
It is also interesting to analyse whether this increase in the mobility of firms is associated more to expansions
or to contractions of firms, once more fully exploiting the high frequency of our data. Figure 6 displays
monthly dummies of linear probability regressions in which the dependent variable is a dummy assigning
value 1 to firms increasing their workforce from one month to the next and zero otherwise (upward mobility)
or 1 to firms shrinking size and 0 otherwise (downward mobility). The right-hand-side includes firm fixed
effects and monthly time dummies. In the upward mobility regressions all monthly dummies in the year after
the introduction of the JA are strictly positive, but then they become not significantly different from zero
when the hiring subsidy is scaled down. The story is slightly different for the downward mobility regression:
here the effect is initially smaller (and in some months coefficients are not significantly different from zero),
but it persists and increases also in 2016. In both cases it is visible a reduction in mobility in November
and December 2014, which may be attributed to anticipation effects, and a huge spike in December 2015
when the subsidy was scaled down. Most of the action seems to come from the hiring subsidy rather than
the graded security contract at least when we look at upward mobility, which actually declines after March
2015.
Overall, the increase in firms’ dynamics observed after the introduction of the JA is not only associated to
expansions of firms, notably above the 15 employees threshold, but also to an increase in firms’ contractions.
Similar results can be obtained by counting jobs (rather than firms) created and destroyed in expanding
and declining units, applying the definitions of the job turnover literature (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999).
Since 2015 there has been an increase in both job creation and job destruction rates, defined as the sum of
firm-level headcount employment growth and decline in continuing firms normalized by total employment
in the base year. Notice that all the measures commented so far concern net employment variations at the
firm level, hence do not capture the reallocation of workers occurring at given employment levels within each
firm. In the next section we look at workers flows, and we focus on hirings and firings on both open ended
and fixed-term contracts as well as transformations from fixed-term to open ended jobs.
4.3 Hirings and Firings
Figure 7 displays total hirings in open ended contracts (top panel) and the total number of firms displaying
positive hirings in open ended contracts (bottom panel). In both cases there is a visible increase (of the order
of almost 30 %) in hirings, notably at the beginning of 2015 with respect to the same months in 2014 and
2013, a huge spike in December 2015 (corresponding to almost a 500 % increase with respect to December
2013 and 2014). In 2016 hires decline broadly to the levels predating the JA. These spikes as well as yearly
variations replicate aggregate dynamics of new open ended hires registered by the Inps Osservatorio del
Precariato12. The lower diagrams of the two panels look at the behaviour of small and large firms. Large
firms are those that were within the band 16-19 between June and December 2014, while small firms are
those that in the same 6 months were in the band 9-12. The diagrams suggest that small firms (line with
small triangles) were more responsive to the hiring subsidy than large firms (dotted line).
The hiring subsidy seems therefore to have led to a strong increase in open ended hirings in 2015 just after
the introduction of the JA, and to an anticipation to December 2015 of the subsidized hires planned for 2016
in order to benefit from the full exemption from employers social security contributions planned for 2015 only.
This interpretation is consistent with the fact that we do not observe a similar pattern in the case of hirings
in fixed-term contracts (Figure 8), not covered by the hiring subsidy. In the case of the transformations of
fixed-term into open ended contracts we notice the same spikes observed in the case of open ended contracts,
in correspondence to the introduction and then the scaling down of the hiring subsidy (Figure 9). In this case
the initial spike (January 2015) is more pronounced than the spike observed in December 2015, a fact that
cannot be explained by changes in the population at risk: the end of the year spike appear to be relatively
12See https://www.inps.it/NuovoportaleINPS
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small even when we normalize transformations by the stock of fixed term contracts at the beginning of the
month, as done in the bottom panel of Figure 9.
The time pattern in the case of firings, notably firings from open ended contracts in continuing firms (Figure
10) is different. Here we observe a moderate increase after March 2015, when the graded security contract
was introduced, spanning well beyond the end of the large hiring subsidy. Indeed no spike is observed in
December 2015. The role of the graded security contract when the focus is on firings is consistent with the
fact that the changes occurred after March 2015 are not visible when we focus on small firms (dotted line in
the bottom panel of Figure 10). Consistently with the theoretical predictions in Section 3, small firms seem
to be affected by the JA only as far as the hiring margin is concerned.
5 Estimation framework
The above suggests that both the hiring subsidy and the graded security contract have affected firms dynamics
as well as workers’ flows. In order to properly evaluate the effects of the JA reform we need i) to define more
precisely the outcomes of interest, and ii) run multivariate regressions taking into account also of firm-specific
and time-varying variables affecting hiring and layoff policies of firms.
5.1 Key definitions and estimating equations
Before detailing our estimation framework, we need to formalize our definitions. Let Yi,t be the outcome
of interest (hirings, separations, contract transformations, etc.) of firm i at month t and Ii,jt = 1 be an
indicator function if firm i has taken a certain action (hiring, layoff, transformation of fixed-term into open
ended contract, etc.) for individual j at month t. Out of J individuals, we have at the firm level:
Yit =
J∑
j=1
Ii,jt if (Ii,jt = 1)
In some specifications we normalize these measures by the initial workforce of the firm so that
yit =
Yit
No
The normalization is done at the initial level of the workforce since total employment is endogenous to the
JA. The outcome yit is therefore defined on a per-worker basis relative to the employment levels in January
2013 for continuing firms, and to the first month in which they have positive employment in the extended
sample.
Another key variable at the job (rather than firm) level is whether or not the new job has been subject to
the hiring subsidy. We let the variable Λi,jt be an indicator function that takes the value 1 if firm i hires
individual j on a open ended contract basis benefitting from the hiring subsidy and 0 otherwise. We also
want to take into account of whether the subsidy is the one present in 2015 and involving potentially a full
exemption from social security contributions or it is the less generous partial de-contribution of 2016. Thus,
defining by H(i, t) total subsidized hires in firm i at time t, we add a time-varying parameter capturing the
birth rate of the jobs, ρt:
Hit =
J∑
j=1
ρtΛi,jt if (Λi,jt = 1),
where ρt =1 if hires took place in 2015, and ρt = 0.5 if the hires took place in 2016. Before 2015, ρt = 0.
Finally, we define dummy variables capturing the key dates of the JA, i.e.: Jan, 15t taking value 1 if the job
was initiated in 2015 benefitting from the largest hiring subsidy, Mar, 15t if the job was initiated after the
date of introduction of the graded security contract (March 2015), and Jan, 16t if the job was initiated in
2016 benefitting from the lower hiring subsidy.
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We run different specifications for each outcome equation. We begin with a simple fixed effect regression
with monthly dummies
Yit = αi + δt + it (4)
where αi is firm fixed effect and it is the error term. The inspection of δt complements the above descriptive
analysis taking into account of time-invariant firm-specific characteristics. Next, we include in this setting
the reform dummies, that is:
Yit = αi + β1Jan, 15t + β2March, 15t + β3Jan, 16t + γHit + it, (5)
where Jan, 15t takes a value 1 since January 2015 at the introduction of the large hiring subsidy of the
JA, and zero otherwise. March, 15t marks the introduction of graded security in March 2015 and Jan, 16t
the halving of the hiring subsidy and the reduction of its duration. A third set of regressions involves also
firm-specific time trends:
Yit = αi + ρit+ β1Jan, 15t + β2March, 15t + β3Jan, 16t + γHit + it, (6)
where ρi is the coefficient on the firm-specific time trend. A fourth set of regressions draws also on the
asymmetries between small and large firms characterized by our model and implied by the JA. Hence, it
includes in the regressors not only time effects and group-specific time trends, but also their interactions
with a dummy capturing small firms.
Yit = αi + β2tSi + δt + γ2Si × Jan, 15t + ηHit + it (7)
where Si is a dummy variable for small firms, and Si × Jan, 15t is the main interaction variable of interest.
The coefficient γ2 captures the interaction between the JA and small firms as of January 2015. An alternative
specification is estimated with firm-specific time trends in lieu of the group-specific time trend
Yit = αi + βit+ δt + γ2Si × Jan, 15t + ηHit + it (8)
where βi is the coefficient of the time trend of firm i, while γ2 is the group-specific effect of the JA on small
firms. Finally we run equations including placebo dummies covering periods before the JA, i.e.:
Yit = αi + δt + β2tSi +
T∑
t=1
γtSi × δt + ηHit + it (9)
where the estimates γt up to December 2014 can be interpreted as placebo. The regressions are run with
the extended sample.
6 Regression Results
Figure 11 displays the δt coefficients (and 95 % confidence bands) for the monthly dummies of the pure firm
fixed effects regression of firm-level open ended hirings. The message is quite clear both when we consider
total hires (top panel) and hires relative to firm-level employment in December 2014 (bottom panel): a
strong increase of new hires occurs in the aftermath of the introduction of the hiring subsidy, and as an
anticipation in December 2015 of the additional hires planned in 2016 (which replicate then the dynamics of
2013 and 2014).
Figure 12 suggests that the JA has not significantly altered the seasonal pattern of hirings in fixed-term
contracts. The negative substitution and positive option value effects would seem to have been mutually
offsetting in affecting fixed-term hirings. In the case of transformations (Figure 13) the two effects operate
in the same direction and the δt coefficients are strongly positive in the aftermath of the JA throughout
2015. Figure 14 finally looks at total firings. Here we see a spike at the end of 2014 as if employers had
anticipated layoffs in order to make room for subsidized hirings in 2015. Here the increase is visible after the
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introduction of the graded security contract in March 2015, and goes well beyond the first year of the JA. As
discussed in Section 3, we should expect a strong asymmetry between small and large firms when we look at
the firing margin, rather than at the hiring margin, as small firms are not affected by the reduction of firing
costs. Figure 15 is consistent with this prediction: the 2015 and 2016 increase in firings are concentrated in
large firms (top panel) while δt coefficients for small firms are never significantly different from zero.
Table 1 displays other specifications for the open ended hirings equations. The coefficient of the dummy
marking the introduction in January 2015 of the hiring subsidy is highly significant and positive, except
when we control for subsidized hirings (second and fourth columns) or we confine our analysis to firms
not benefitting from the hiring subsidy (fifth and sixth columns). In the latter cases coefficients are either
negative and/or not statistically significant. The number of subsidized hirings unsurprisingly positively
affects hires per firm, while the dummy capturing the introduction of the graded security contract is always
significant and negative. A possible interpretation of this result is that the anticipations of open ended hires
induced by the 2015 hiring subsidy dominate the other policies13. Indeed also the coefficient for the 2016
less generous hiring subsidy is negative. This interpretation is consistent with the observation of a positive
coefficients for the monthly dummies following the introduction of the graded security contract in richer
specifications of the open ended hiring equation when control is made also for the asymmetry in the response
of small and large firms (Table 2). Small firms appear once more to be more responsive than large firms on
the hiring margin, while they are not responsive to the JA on the firing margin.
7 Final Remarks
This paper uses a unique dataset drawn from the Italian social security records to study the effects of the
Italian Jobs Act. The latter involves two main policies: a marginal subsidy for hiring on a open ended basis
as well as a new labor contract based on graded security, in the spirit of the idea of Boeri and Garibaldi
(2008) and Boeri et al. (2017). Whereas the marginal hiring subsidy applied to all firms, the new contract
reduced costs of dismissals only for firms above the 15 employees threshold. Due to a cap in the hiring
subsidy the latter was in general more generous to small and low-wage firms than for large and relatively
high-wage firms.
According to the predictions of a simple model of hiring and firing with fixed wages, we show that the
hiring subsidy and the graded security contract should have operated along both margins, increasing either
hirings and firings. In order to identify separately the effects of the two policies, one can rely on the different
timing of the two measures (the hiring subsidy begun in January 2015, the graded security contract in March
2015) as well as on the asymmetry between small and large firms. We show that the former should react to
the JA only on the hiring margin while the latter on both hiring and firing.
We find an increase in mobility in the aftermath of the introduction of the JA, measured either as the
number of firms passing the 15 employees threshold or as mobility measures for transition matrices. We
also observe a significant increase in open ended hiring as well as an increase in the transformation of fixed-
term contracts into open ended contracts. Fixed-term hiring is largely unaffected by the JA, which may be
attributed to the presence of two mutually offsetting effects: a negative substitution effect inducing employers
to replace fixed-term hiring with open ended contracts, and a positive option value effect inducing a larger
use of fixed-term contracts as extended probationary periods for open ended hirings. The two effects are
operating in the same direction in the case of the transformations of fixed-term into open ended contracts
that indeed increase substantially in the aftermath of the JA.
The 2015 hiring subsidy dominates the graded security contract in its impact on hirings. The effect of the
graded security contract is visible over and beyond the hiring subsidy when we look at the firing margin.
In the latter case small firms are unresponsive to the reforms, whose impact is concentrated on large firms.
Small firms are instead reacting more than large firms to the hiring subsidy, which is more generous for
13Cirillo et al.(2015) argue that the softening of EPL lowers the bargaining power of workers at all levels leading to a decrease
in open ended hiring in both large and small firms, offsetting the increase in open ended hiring generated by lower EPL in large
units.
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them.
Further work may wish to look at individual incentives to switch jobs when reforms reducing employment
protection are introduced at the margin. Another interesting dimension for further research relates to the
transformation of fixed-term into open ended contracts within the same firm, unfolding the option value of
hiring with fixed term contracts.
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Appendix:
A Basic Model of Hiring and Firing at the Job Level
The theoretical framework used to analyse the effect of the JA policies is the matching model of hiring and
firing proposed by Garibaldi and Violante (2015). The model is fully in line with the traditional Mortensen
and Pissarides matching model (2014), but rather than working with the traditional matching function for
job creation, it highlights explicitly the role of hiring and firing margins. In the model the matching function
is described by a simple searching probability α and market tightness does not play any role. Firms buy the
rights to post a vacancy at an endogenous flow cost q, and post vacancies driving the value of a vacancy
to zero. Following Garibaldi and Violante (2005), the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity is indicated
with F (x), the hiring margin is indicated with Ro while the firing margin is indicated with Rd. The model
is mainly partial equilibrium and we solve it for a given wage ω. The two policy instruments are a severance
payment (or a firing tax) S and a hiring subsidy H(ω).
The value of a vacancy reads
rV = −q + αu
v
{
.
∫ x
Ro
[J(z) +H(ω)] dF (z)− [1− F (Ro)]V
}
(10)
Since the value of vacancy is driven down to zero by firm competition V = 0, the price of vacancy licence
reads
q =
αu
v
∫ x
Ro
[J(z) +H(ω)] dF (z) (11)
The value of a filled job is indicated with J and its value reads
(r + λ)J(x) = x− ω +
∫ x
Rd
J(z)dF (z)− λF (Rd)S (12)
The two key hiring and firing margins at the job level are determined by the following key equations J(Ro) = −H(ω) Hiring Margin
J(Rd) = −S Firing Margin
(13)
The hiring subsidy implies that the marginal hire is such that J(Ro)+H(ω)=0 Finally, new jobs are created
above the hiring margin while jobs below the firing margin are destroyed. Total hiring flows are
 Hirings = α[1− F (Ro)]
Firings = λF (Rd)
(14)
To obtain the hiring and firing condition one needs to integrate by part the expected value of the job in
equation (12), and using the fact that J ′ = 1r+λ . Further, using the fact that the firing margin J(Rd) =−S(ω), the value of a job reads
J(x) =
x−Rd
r + λ
+ S (15)
while its expected value is ∫ x
Rd
J(x)dF (z) =
1
r + λ
∫ x
Rd
(1− F (z))dz (16)
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The results of the two expressions can then be used to obtain the key firing condition Rd. The creation is
then similarly derived in using the fact that J(Ro) = −H(ω)
Ro − ω = − λr+λ
∫ x
Rd
(1− F (z))dz + λS − (r + λ)H; Hiring Margin
Rd − ω = − λr+λ
∫ x
Rd
(1− F (z))dz − rS; Firing Margin.
(17)
To show that the hiring curve is upward sloping one needs to differentiate Ro with respect to Ri and show
that it is strictly positive, so that ∂Ro∂Rd =
λ
r+λ (1 − F (Rd)) > 0. The firing margin is clearly independent of
the hiring margin.
The predictions of the two policies at the firm level can be obtained by simple comparative statics. The
effect of the hiring subsidy on the hiring margin is obtained by differentiating the top equation in (17)
with respect to H so as to obtain ∂Ro∂H(ω) = −(r + λ) < 0. In other words, the hiring curve shifts to the
left with higher hiring subsidy as in the left panel of Figure 3 in the text. Since total hires are given by
Hirings = α[1 − F (Ro)]], total hires obviously increase in response to a larger subsidy. The effect of the
firing S on the two margin can be studied in similar fashion. Looking at the firing margin, the differentiation
of Rd with respect to S yields- after simple algebra
∣∣∂Rd
∂S
∣∣
Ro=Ro
= − r+λr+λF (Rd) < 0, so that lower firing costs
increase firings. In other words, the firing curve shifts up with lower firing costs as in the right panel of
Figure 3 in the text. The effect on the S of the hiring curve is
∣∣∂Ro
∂S
∣∣
Rd=Rd
= −λ < 0 so that the hiring
curve shifts up as in the right panel of Figure 3 in the main text.
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Table 1: Regressions of Difference Across Time: Open Ended Hires
Dependent Variable: Total Open Ended Hires
Firm Fixed Effect Firm Specific Trend Firms with No Incentive
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
β1 (January 2015 onward) 0.0536*** -0.0441*** 0.0712*** -0.0482*** -0.0050 0.0030
(0.0030) (0.0040) (0.0065) (0.0073) (0.0026) (0.0064)
β2 (March 2015 onward) -0.0194*** - 0.0214*** -0.0171*** -0.0197*** -0.0153*** -0.017***
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0065) (0.0040) (0.0025) (0.0035)
β3 (January 2016 onward) -0.0279*** 0.0106*** -0.0165 0.0304*** 0.030*** .0.0215*
(0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0123) (0.0124) (0.027) (0.0125)
γ (Subsidized hires) . 0.0134*** . 0.0163*** . .
(0.0003) . (0.0004) . .
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Specific Trend No No Yes Yes No Yes
Observations 2,900,159 2,900,159 2,900,159 2,900,159 1,248,091 1,248,091
R-squared 0,0042 0.149 0.156 0.0017 0.1846
Number of id 62467 62467 62467 62467 26601 26601
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1
In all regressions the dependent variable is the total hires per firm
Models in Column (1) and (2) is Yit = αi + β1Jan, 15t + β2March, 15t + β3Jan, 16t + γHit
Models in Columns (3) and (4) is Yit = αi + ρit+ β1Jan, 15t + β2March15t + β3Jan, 16t + γHit + it
Model in Columns (5) and (6) refer to firms that did not use the hiring subsidy.
Column (5) is fixed effect and Column (6) is firm specific trend.
αi is firm fixed effect; t is a time trend, ρi is the firm specific trend;
β1, β2 and β3 are the coefficients of the policy dummies from January 2015,
from March 2015 onward, and from January 2016 onward respectively
21
Table 2: Regressions of Difference Across Firm Groups and Time: Open Ended Hires
Dependent Variable: Total Open Ended Hires
Trend for Small Firms Firm Specific Trend Small Firms × Month
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Small-Firms Jobs Act .0344464*** -.0130826*** .0433878 *** -.0139161*** - -
(.0028329 ) ( .0026939 ) (.0031347 ) ( .002825 ) - -
Hiring Subsidy .0137707**** - .0167661*** - .0137959 *** -
(.0004035 ) ( .0005062) (.0004042)
Trend small firms -.0003637 **** .0000959** . . . .
(.000095) ( .0000959 ) . . . .
11-2014× Small Firms - - - - 0.122 ** .0121232**
- - - - (.0043795 ) (.0043772 )
12-2014 ×Small Firms - - - - .0121133** .0120765 **
- - - - ( .0063394) (.0046059 )
1-2015 × Small Firms - - - - .0368*** -.0047236
- - - - (.0063394) (.0062609 )
2-2015× Small Firms - - - - .037265 *** -.004543
- - - - (.0053958) (.0053147)
3-2015×Small Firms - - - - .0424015*** .0002447
- - - - ( .0054287 ) (.0053792 )
4-2014×Small Firms - - - - .0287611*** -.013705 **
- - - - (0062915 ) (.0062887 )
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trend for Small Firms Yes Yes No No No No
Firm Specific Trend No No Yes Yes No No
Observations 2,900,159 2,900,159 2,959,359 2,959,359 2,900,159 2,900,159
R-squared 0.0219 0.0042 .1535 0.1468 0.346 0.0216
Number of id 62,467 62,467 62,467 62,467 62,467 62,467
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1
In all regressions the dependent variable is the total hires per firm
Models in Column (1) and (2) is Yit = αi + β2tSi + δt + γ2Si × JAN, 15t + ηHit + it
Models in Columns (3) and (4) is Yit = αi + βit+ δt + γ2Si × JAN, 15t + ηHit + it
Model in Columns (5) and (6) is Yit = αi + δt + β2tSi +
∑T
t=1 γtSi × δt + ηHit + it
αi is firm fixed effect; t is a time trend; βi is the firm specific trend, Si is dummy for small firms (9-12 size)
JAN, 15t is a dummy taking value 1 after January 2015
Hit is the total number of subsidized hiring in firm i
The omitted monthly dummy is September 2014
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Figure 4: Threshold Passing
Note: Threshold Passing refers to the number of firms that in month t employ a total workforce above 15 employees
and in month t− 12 had less than 15 employees. The employees are obtained with the full time equivalent estimate
provided by Inps.
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Figure 5: Shorrock Mobility Index
Note: Monthly Shorrock mobility indexes computed over yearly transition matrices.
Shorrock index is bound between 0 and 1 where 0 corresponds to no mobility and 1 to no immobility
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Figure 6: Time Dummies in Mobility Regressions
Note The estimated equation is the linear probability model Yit = αi+δt+it, where Yit = 1 if the firms experiences
mobility upward (downward) and zero otherwise. The omitted time dummy is September 2014, and the estimation
drops also the dummy January 2013 to identify the fixed effect.
The Figure displays the δt coefficients together with the 95% confidence intervals.
25
Figure 7: Total Hires: Open Ended
Note: The top panel counts Hires while the bottom Panel counts the number of firms that have open ended Hires.
The lower figure in each panel measures differently for large and small firms. Small firms employ between 9 and 12
employees in the second semester of 2014. Large firms employ between 16 and 19 employees in the second semester
of 2014. Firm size is measured through the full time equivalent definition provided by Inps
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Figure 8: Total Hires Under Fixed-Term Contracts
Note: Total number of new hires under a fixed-term contract basis.
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Figure 9: Total Transformations from Fixed-Term into Open Ended Contracts
Note Transformations of Fixed-Term Contracts into Open Ended Hires. Top panel: Total Transformations Bottom
Panel: Mean Transformation per Worker
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Figure 10: All Firings in Continuing Firms Sample
Note Top panel: Total Individual Firings in the continuining firm sample. Bottom panel: Total Firings from Open
Ended Contracts in small firms (9 to 12 employees in the second semester 2014) and large firms (above 15 employees
in the second semester of 2014). Firm size is measured through the full time equivalent definition provided by Inps.
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Figure 11: Single Difference: Time Dummies in New Open Ended Hires
Note The estimated equation is Yit = αi + δt + it. The Figure displays the δt coefficients together with the 95%
confidence intervals. The omitted monthly dummy is September 2014, and the estimation drops also the dummy
January 2013 to identify the fixed effect
Top panel: The dependent variable is new open ended hires at the firm level. In the bottom panel the dependent
variable is new open ended hires relative to the employment level of the firm in January 2013.
30
Figure 12: Single Difference: Time Dummies in New Fixed Term Hires
Note The estimated equation is Yit = αi + δt + it. The Figure displays the δt coefficients together with the 95%
confidence intervals. The omitted monthly dummy is September 2014, and the estimation drops also the dummy
January 2013 to identify the fixed effect
Top panel: The dependent variable is new hires on a fixed term basis at the firm level. In the bottom panel the
dependent variable is new fixed-term hire relative to employment in January 2013.
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Figure 13: Single Difference: Transformations into Open Ended Contracts
Note The estimated equation is Yit = αi + δt + it. The Figure displays the δt coefficients together with the 95%
confidence intervals. The omitted monthly dummy is September 2014, and the estimation drops also the dummy
January 2013 to identify the fixed effect
Top panel: The dependent variable is new transformations into open ended contracts at the firm level. In the bottom
panel the dependent variable is new transformation into open ended relative to employment in January 2013.
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Figure 14: Single Difference: Total Firings in Extended Sample
Note The estimated equation is Yit = αi + δt + it. The Figure displays the δt coefficients together with the 95%
confidence intervals. The omitted monthly dummy is September 2014, and the estimation drops also the dummy
January 2013 to identify the fixed effect
The dependent variable is total firings. The sample includes also firm exit.
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Figure 15: Single Difference: Firings in Large and Small Firms, Extended Sample
Note The estimated equation is Yit = αi + δt + it. The Figure displays the δt coefficients together with the
95% confidence intervals. The omitted time dummy is September 2014, and the estimation drops also the dummy
January 2013 to identify the fixed effect
Top Panel: Total Individual Firings in large firms (above 15 employees in the second semester of 2014). Bottom
panel: Total Firings from open ended contracts in small firms (9 to 12 employees in the second semester of 2014).
Firm size is measured through the full time equivalent definition provided by Inps.
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